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Examining the Constitutionality of the 2025 Nigerian Central Gaming Bill

Before diving into the legal aspects, it is important to acknowledge that the idea behind a centralized gaming regulation could significantly benefit operators. A centralized gaming regulation in Nigeria could streamline operations. It would eliminate the need for multiple state licenses, reducing regulatory costs and compliance burdens. A uniform tax structure would provide clarity, while easier market expansion would attract investors. A centralized system could also enhance consumer confidence, create a more predictable business environment, and align Nigeria’s gaming industry with global standards.

However, Nigeria operates as a federation, meaning regulatory authority is shared between the federal and state governments. The Nigerian Constitution does not list gaming under the Exclusive or Concurrent Legislative Lists, defining matters under federal or shared jurisdiction. Instead, gaming falls under residual matters, meaning state governments regulate it. Section 4(7) of the 1999 Constitution explicitly states that any matter not listed in the Exclusive or Concurrent Lists falls under the authority of the State Houses of Assembly. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this constitutional provision stand in the case of the Attorney-General of Lagos State & Ors v. Attorney-General of the Federation & Ors. Repealing the National Lottery Act, the Supreme Court ruled that gaming regulation is under the purview of state governments. 

Another issue with the Central Gaming Bill (“CGB”) is that gambling is prohibited in some northern states based on religious beliefs. A federal law attempting to regulate gaming nationwide could conflict with the existing laws in these states. Since the CGB is still a bill and has not been enacted into law, the focus should first be on its constitutionality rather than its potential benefits or drawbacks.

The legislators behind the bill rely on the fact that telecommunications and the Internet are listed under the Exclusive Legislative List. They posit that since online gaming operates through digital platforms and telecommunications networks, the federal government can regulate it under its control of telecommunications. However, the Constitution does not explicitly mention gambling, betting, or gaming within these provisions, making the argument weak and open to legal challenges by states and further regulatory disruptions in the future.

If the Central Gaming Bill becomes law, it presents several risks for operators. One major concern is legal uncertainty and possible lawsuits from state authorities, as the bill contradicts a Supreme Court ruling. This could lead to long legal battles and create an unstable regulatory environment for operators. Another risk is overregulation and a heavier compliance burden. Instead of simplifying the process, a federal gaming law could add more layers of regulation. If operators are required to comply with both state and federal regulations, it could increase their administrative costs rather than reduce them.

Conclusion

A centralized gaming regulation could foster industry growth and bring efficiency, cost savings, and growth opportunities for operators, but the process has to be done constitutionally. Enacting an unconstitutional law would disrupt Nigeria’s regulatory framework, leading to prolonged legal disputes, regulatory instability, and increased compliance burdens rather than ease them. Operators need a clear and predictable regulatory environment, and the ongoing jurisdictional conflict between the federal and state governments only creates more confusion. Resolving these disputes within the constitutional framework is essential to ensure a stable and business-friendly gaming industry in Nigeria.

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